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THE POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE PUZZLE OF
DECISION RULES FOR JURIES: THE EXAMPLE OF
DECISION RULES FOR CIVIL LITIGATION IN

STATE COURTS
Warren F. Schwartz*

I.

INTRODUCTION

All of the decision rules for juries in state courts, deciding civil
cases, are what may be characterized as "two way" rules. Whatever
consensus is required to secure a favorable verdict applies to all parties
to the litigation. The governing decision rule varies from 2/3 in three
states,' to a supermajority of 5/62 or 3/43 in a majority of states, to
unanimity in a minority of states.4 Thus, in the usual twelve person jury,
in the various states, from eight to twelve jurors must concur for a
verdict to be returned. If neither side is supported by a sufficient number
of jurors to satisfy the decision rule, the jury "hangs": No verdict is
rendered and the case may be retried one or more times.

* Emeritus Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I wish to acknowledge
my great intellectual debt to Edward P. Schwartz, my son and sometimes collaborator. The theory
employed in this paper was developed in a series of articles we co-authored, analyzing decisionmaking by juries in criminal cases. Since he was my mentor in social choice theory, I cannot
entirely absolve him from responsibility for any errors I make in this paper. The papers are: And So
Say Some of Us... What to Do When Jurors Disagree,9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 429 (2000); The
Challenge of Peremptory Challenges, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 325 (1996); Deciding Who Decides
Who Dies: Capital Punishment as a Social Choice Problem, I LEGAL THEORY 113 (1995);
Decisionmaking by Juries Under Unanimity and Supermajority Voting Rules, 80 GEO. L.J. 775
(1992).
1. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1354 (2005); MO. CONST. art. 1, § 22(a) (applying only to
courts not of record); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-7-403 (2005).
2. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 234, § 34A (2005).
3. See, e.g., ARIz. R. Civ. P. 49(a).
4. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 1.93 1(1) (West 2005). However, if the jury has deliberated
for at least six hours, a verdict "may be rendered by all jurors, excepting one of the jurors." Id.
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This paper addresses two interrelated questions: 1) What is the
normative theory that does (or should) determine the choice of a
decision rule; and 2) How do jurors behave when their sincere individual
preferences are so divided that the decision rule cannot be satisfied if
each juror votes in accordance with her view as to what outcome is the
correct one?
II.

MAJORITIES, MINORITIES AND THE POWER TO PREVENT THE
OTHER PARTY FROM WINNING

The basic structure of prevailing decision rules is difficult to
explain. On first impression, the purpose of a decision rule would appear
to be to distribute power between majority and minority factions. The
more demanding the decision rule, the smaller the minority must be in
order to prevent the majority from prevailing. The most demanding rule,
unanimity, permits a single juror to block all of the remaining jurors
from rendering a verdict. A simple majority rule, not employed in any
state, would preclude a5 minority of any size from preventing the
majority from prevailing.
This scheme embodies two interrelated normative puzzles: 1) What
is the theory which determines how large a minority should be to be
assigned influence in the decision-making process; and 2) If a minority
is sufficiently large, should it be empowered to prevail or only to prevent
the other party from prevailing?
The actual outcome in the states, with respect to civil litigation, is
uniformly to answer the second question by conferring only the power to
block the other side from prevailing. The answer to the first question is
unclear. The actual choice is to empower a minority as small as one, a
minority of 3 or 4 and, rarely, a minority of at least 5.

III.

THE POWER TO BLOCK OR THE POWER TO PREVAIL

In civil litigation, if the power to prevail were conferred on a
minority faction, it would be necessary to decide which side would have
the burden of satisfying the decision rule or having the other party
prevail. Although, in general, the attitude in civil litigation is thought to
be essentially neutral, various provisions do confer procedural
5. For some reason that historians have been unable to unearth, the Anglo-American jury has
an even number of members: traditionally twelve, sometimes six. A simple majority decision cannot
be used for a decision-making body with an even number of members. The size of the jury could, of
course, be changed to an uneven number. No state employs a decision rule requiring the
concurrence of seven of twelve jurors.
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advantages on one side or the other. Burden of proof, presumptions and
obligations to reimburse a winning plaintiffs litigation costs are all
means of favoring one side or the other. However, empowering a party
with only minority support to prevail would represent an unprecedented
and extreme deviation from a posture of neutrality. I cannot imagine a
class of cases in which such a course would be desirable. Nor do I
believe that any legislature would empower a minority of jurors to return
a verdict. It seems inescapable, then, that if minority sentiment on the
jury is to be assigned influence in the decision-making process, it must
be done by a means other than empowering the minority to prevail.
IV.

THE POWER OF THE MINORITY TO PREVENT THE MAJORITY FROM
PREVAILING

Current legal rules provide no answer to the question of what result
should be reached when neither side commands the support required to
satisfy the decision rule. If the jury hangs (a possibility under all existing
decision rules) it is as if nothing has been decided. The only way an
authoritative outcome can be achieved is if the decision rule is satisfied
in a subsequent trial. But, if the first jury hangs, there is a strong
likelihood that subsequent juries will also hang. Moreover, it is possible
that the first jury, which hangs truly represents "a fair cross section of
the population,, 6 and the second jury, which does render a verdict, is
biased in one direction or the other as the result of a sampling error. Put
more generally, when a jury hangs, this may be a true indication that it is
very uncertain as to what is the "correct" outcome.
I confidently conjecture that there are a substantial number of cases
in which, if each juror voted sincerely, based on her belief as to what the
correct outcome was, the result would be that the jury would hang and
could not return a verdict. In many of these cases, however, rather than
hanging, the jury returns a compromise verdict. The formal requirement
for a compromise verdict is that a sufficient number of jurors to satisfy
the decision rule prefer the outcome to hanging. Viewed from this
perspective, the decision rule defines the minimum size of a minority
faction that a majority faction must induce to support a particular
outcome in order for a verdict to be rendered. The compromise outcome
will not be the one most preferred by either the majority or minority
faction. However, both majority and minority prefer the compromise
outcome to failing to reach a verdict.

6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4501 (2005).
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This analysis brings us to the heart of the matter. Do we want a jury
substantially divided as to what outcome should be reached to hang or
fashion a compromise verdict? As far as I am aware, no court or
legislature has articulated a position as to whether jury compromise is a
good or bad thing. It certainly reduces the instances of juries hanging.
But the result is not necessarily the one most favored either by the
majority or minority. Compromise, moreover, requires some jurors to
vote contrary to their true belief with respect to various issues in the
case.
To illuminate this difficult issue I pose the following hypothetical:
Suppose that the decision rule requires the concurrence of nine jurors.
Eight jurors believe that the defendant should be held liable. Four jurors
believe that the defendant should not be held liable. Consequently, if all
jurors vote sincerely, a verdict cannot be rendered.
Assume further, however, that the eight jurors who favor imposing
liability wish to award higher damages than do the four jurors who
oppose imposing liability. Both majority and minority may, however,
prefer to avoid hanging by imposing liability and awarding damages
smaller than those preferred by the majority but larger than those
preferred by the minority. For this compromise to be implemented,
members of the minority faction must vote insincerely to impose liability
and award damages larger than they believe should be awarded and the
majority faction must vote insincerely to award damages smaller than
they believe should be awarded.
V.

To

COMPROMISE OR NOT TO COMPROMISE

It is not clear the extent to which the variety of decision rules
reflects a difference in attitude toward compromise verdicts. It is true
that all changes in decision rules have been in the direction of less
demanding rules, most significantly the abandonment of unanimity. It is
also true that the more demanding the decision rule, the more often that
compromise will be required for a verdict to be rendered. Thus, the
direction of legislative change should result in fewer compromise
verdicts.
On the other hand, several states have retained the unanimity rule
and others a rule requiring a majority often. The use of a unanimity rule
or a demanding supermajority rule does appear designed to assign
influence to minority sentiment. The crucial question, which remains
unclear, is whether that influence is intended to be exercised by a
minority that uses its power to block the majority in order to force a
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compromise outcome. This analysis takes us to the heart of the matter. Is
there something to be said for compromise verdicts beyond their
practical value in reducing the number of instances in which a jury fails
to render a verdict?
The case for the compromise verdict, ultimately, must rest on the
belief that minority sentiment should have some influence on the
outcome. As discussed above, that influence cannot consist of the
minority being empowered to prevail. In fact, the minority does
sometimes exercise influence under current law by threatening to
prevent the majority from rendering a verdict.
This may be justified as a very crude way to divide power between
the majority and minority. Perhaps, however, it is better than a less
demanding rule (a simple majority is the least demanding rule) which
empowers a majority completely to disregard substantial minority
sentiment. There are, after all, "close" cases with respect to which
reasonable persons can disagree as to what outcome is the "correct" one.
Indeed, it may be that there is no "correct" outcome but only different
assessments of essentially indeterminate legal or factual issues. It is
certainly true that there are many cases in which verdicts either imposing
liability or exonerating the defendant would be affirmed on appeal.
Similarly, a wide range of damage awards would be accepted by
appellate courts.
If you will, the apparent assumption of the legal system is that
outcomes are either correct or incorrect. When, however, there is
substantial disagreement among members of the jury, there is a
significant possibility that the outcome favored by the minority is
"correct" or that the "correct" result is indeterminate.
Admittedly, awarding smaller damages when a minority believes
that the defendant should not be held liable represents a substantial
departure from prevailing legal tradition. However, that is what, in fact,
is probably often happening under current rules. It is a substantially
imperfect response to the uncertainties which plague the litigation
process. I can only wonder whether it is better than frequent hung juries,
reflecting sincere disagreement among the members of the jury or
empowering majorities to disregard the views of substantial minorities.
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